

27 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Minutes of Special Group Meeting of
26 March 1963

PRESENT : McGeorge Bundy, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis
Johnson, John McCone, Brockway McMillan,
[redacted] Herbert
Scoville, Jr.

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1. Low-levels over Cuba. Mr. Lundahl presented several examples of high and low photography of the same area to indicate the differences in the coverage obtained. DCI spoke in favor of low levels but indicated that they could not be justified on the basis that they might uncover a major threat to the U. S. security. Mr. McCone explained the differences of view within the Agency in light of the Donovan situation. Clearly the low levels would not improve the Donovan mission's chances, but how serious would be the effect was uncertain. DCI indicated he was in favor of covering 1 or 2 key spots as a start. If coverage of the camps was undertaken, they should be carried out simultaneously. Mr. Gilpatric stated that DOD did not feel there was any urgent need for the coverage unless State felt that this was an opportune time from a political point of view. JCS was in favor, but General Taylor did not feel it was urgent. These views of the DOD would not be altered by the Donovan situation. They believe that the need for overflights should be critical or related to some other policy move. Mr. Johnson said that he had discussed the matter with the Secretary of State, and they did not feel any need to establish the right to do this at this point. Ambassador Thompson was against it so far as it might affect Soviet relations, but Mr. Johnson did not know Thompson's reason. Mr. Bundy suggested that they take the divided view to higher authority, particularly as it might affect the Donovan situation; but the DCI felt that this was perhaps not appropriate to put the responsibility up to higher authority at this time and that they should put it off and re-examine on a periodic basis.

2. Indonesia. State was strongly against; DCI strongly in favor; and State was not liable to be softened in their point of view. Bundy

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tended to concur with State although he admitted this was a clear-cut case of where 2 U. S. policies came in conflict and that sometimes this was difficult to resolve. Gilpatric said that DOD was not convinced by the Reber paper of the need for the coverage. Since all positions were essentially frozen prior to the meeting, it was agreed that the matter would be referred to higher authority for decision.

3. The NRO monthly forecast was tabled, and the DCI briefed the Group on the problems we had been having with both satellite and U-2 reconnaissance. Mr. Gilpatric pointed out that a program was being developed to provide more flexibility and back-up in the future in order to avoid a repetition of the present unsatisfactory state.



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[Redacted]

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5. Finally, I briefed on the results of the [Redacted] which I indicated could be quite significant if substantiated when all data is available. Mr. Bundy queried as to whether this type of data was reliable, and I indicated that it was perhaps too early to say but that it looked very promising. I also indicated that we hoped to use similar techniques against FAN SONGS in the future.

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Signed Herbert Scoville, Jr.
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)

cc: DDCI

ODDR:HScoville:jlp (7713)

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